The Consistency of Fairness Rules: An Experimental Study

Paloma Ubeda

No 2010005, Discussion Papers from University of Oxford, Nuffield College

Abstract: In the last two decades, experimental papers on distributive justice have abounded. Two main results have been replicated. Firstly, there is a multiplicity of fairness rules. Secondly, fairness decisions differ depending on the context. This paper studies individual consistency in the use of fairness rules, as well as the structural factors that lead people to be inconsistent. We use a within-subject design, which allows us to compare individual behavior when the context changes. In line with the literature, we find a multiplicity of fairness rules. However, when we control for consistency, the set of fairness rules is considerably smaller. Only selfishness and strict egalitarianism seem to survive the stricter requirement of consistency. We observe that this result is mainly explained by a self-serving bias. Participants select the rule that is individually optimal in each situation.

Keywords: Distributive Justice; Fairness; Laboratory Experiments; Self-serving bias; Consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2010-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The consistency of fairness rules: An experimental study (2014)
Working Paper: The Consistency of Fairness Rules: An Experimental Study (2010)
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