Network Neutrality under ISP duopoly: on the ability to assign capacity

Duarte Brito, Pedro Pereira and João Vareda ()

CEFAGE-UE Working Papers from University of Evora, CEFAGE-UE (Portugal)

Abstract: We analyze the impact of network neutrality regulation on: (i) competition between CPs, and on (ii) ISPs. incentives to invest. We consider both competition between ISPs and between CPs and show that, if ISPs can o¤er network services of different quality to CPs, they prefer to sell the highest quality network services to the CP that collects the highest advertising revenues. We further show that the impact of network neutrality regulation on the investment in the quality of network services is potentially ambiguous and depends on: (i) whether ISPs are symmetric, and (ii) the ISPs.ability to assign network.s capacity to CPs. If ISPs are symmetric and have full discretion on how to allocate the level of quality of network services among CPs, investment and welfare are higher under the discriminatory regime.

Keywords: Network Neutrality; Competition; Investment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L43 L51 L96 L98 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-net and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cfe:wpcefa:2013_19

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