The Intrinsic Comparative Dynamics of Locally Differentiable Feedback Nash Equilibria of Autonomous and Exponentially Discounted Infinite Horizon Differential Games

Michael Caputo and Chen Ling

No 2012-03, Working Papers from University of Central Florida, Department of Economics

Abstract: The comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria are derived for the ubiquitous class of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games. The resulting refutable implications are intrinsic to the said class of differential games, and thus form their basic, empirically testable, properties. Their relationship with extant results in optimal control theory and static game theory is discussed. Separability conditions are identified on the instantaneous payoff and transition functions under which the intrinsic comparative dynamics collapse, in form, to those in optimal control problems. Applications of the results to capital accumulation and sticky-price games are provided.

Keywords: comparative dynamics; differential games; feedback Nash equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 Pages
Date: 2012-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://economics.itweb.ucf.edu/workingpapers/2012-03.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cfl:wpaper:2012-03

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Central Florida, Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Uluc Aysun ().