The Political Economy of Bad Data: Evidence from African Survey & Administrative Studies- Working Paper 373

Justin Sandefur
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Justin Sandefur

No 373, Working Papers from Center for Global Development

Abstract: Across multiple African countries, discrepancies between administrative data and independent household surveys suggest official statistics systematically exaggerate development progress. We provide evidence for two distinct explanations of these discrepancies. First, governments misreport to foreign donors, as in the case of a results-based aid program rewarding reported vaccination rates. Second, national governments are themselves misled by frontline service providers, as in the case of primary education, where official enrollment numbers diverged from survey estimates after funding shifted from user fees to per pupil government grants. Both syndromes highlight the need for incentive compatibility between data systems and funding rules.

Keywords: Africa; national statistics systems; household surveys; administrative data; immunization; school enrollment; EMIS; HMIS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C83 E31 I15 I25 I32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-dev and nep-mac
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cgd:wpaper:373

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