Who Runs the International System? Power and the Staffing of the United Nations Secretariat - Working Paper 376

Paul Novosad
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Paul Novosad

No 376, Working Papers from Center for Global Development

Abstract: National governments frequently pull strings to get their citizens appointed to senior positions in international institutions. We examine, over a 60 year period, the nationalities of the most senior positions in the United Nations Secretariat, ostensibly the world's most representative international institution. The results indicate which nations are successful in this zero-sum game, and what national characteristics correlate with power in international institutions. The most overrepresented countries are small, rich democracies like the Nordic countries. Statistically, democracy, investment in diplomacy, and economic/military power are predictors of senior positions--even after controlling for the U.N. staffing mandate of competence and integrity. National control over the United Nations is remarkably sticky; however the in influence of the United States has diminished as US ideology has shifted away from its early allies. In spite of the decline in US influence, the Secretariat remains pro-American relative to the world at large.

Keywords: United Nations; international institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F5 F53 F59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54 pages
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cgd:wpaper:376

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