Global Health Donors Viewed as Regulators of Monopolistic Service Providers: Lessons from Regulatory Literature - Working Paper 424

Han Ye

No 424, Working Papers from Center for Global Development

Abstract: Controlling healthcare costs while promoting maximum health impact in the recipient countries is one the biggest challenges for global health donors. This paper views global health donors as the regulators of monopolistic service providers, and explores potential optimal fund payment systems under asymmetric information. It provides a summary and assessment of the prevailing optimal price regulation designs for monopolistic serviceproviders. A set of non-Bayesian approaches that are relevant and applicable for the global health donors are discussed. It also reviews incentive contracting experience between the public and private sectors.

Keywords: Healthcare costs; global health donors; monopolistic service providers; incentive contracting funding; Latin America; financial fragilities. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 56 pages
Date: 2016-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea
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