Learning about the Enforcement of Conditional Welfare Programs: Evidence from Brazil

Fernanda Brollo, Katja Kaufmann and Eliana La Ferrara
Additional contact information
Fernanda Brollo: University of Warwick
Eliana La Ferrara: Bocconi University

CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)

Abstract: We study the implementation of Bolsa Familia, a program that conditions cash transfers to poor families on children’s school attendance. Using unique administrative data, we analyze how beneficiaries respond to the enforcement of conditionality. Making use of random variation in the day on which punishments are received, we find that school attendance increases after families are punished for past noncompliance. Families also respond to penalties experienced by peers: a child’s attendance increases if her own classmates, but also her siblings’ classmates (in other grades or schools), experience enforcement. As the severity of penalties increases with repeated noncompliance, households’ response is larger when peers receive a penalty that the family has not (yet) received. We thus find evidence of spillover effects and learning about enforcement.Keywords: JEL Classification:

Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resea ... /317-2017_brollo.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Learning about the Enforcement of Conditional Welfare Programs: Evidence from Brazil (2017)
Working Paper: Learning about the Enforcement of Conditional Welfare Programs: Evidence from Brazil (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cge:wacage:317

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jane Snape ().