Firm and Market Response to Saving Constraints: Evidence from the Kenyan Dairy Industry

Lorenzo Casaburi and Rocco Macchiavello
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Lorenzo Casaburi: University of Zurich

CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)

Abstract: Despite extensive evidence that preferences are often time-inconsistent, there is only scarce field evidence of willingness to pay for commitment. Infrequent payments may naturally provide commitment for lumpy expenses. Multiple experiments in the Kenyan dairy sector show that: i) farmers are willing to incur sizable costs to receive infrequent payments and demand for commitment is an important driver of this preference; ii) poor contract enforcement, however, limits competition among buyers in the supply of infrequent payments; iii) in such a market, the effects of price increases on sales depend on both buyer credibility and payment frequency. Infrequent payments are common in many goods and labor markets, but they may not be competitively offered when contracts are not enforceable.

Keywords: Saving Constraints; Commitment; Agricultural Markets; Contract Enforcement; Interlinked Transactions. JEL Classification: O12, O16, D90, Q13. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-com, nep-dev, nep-exp, nep-mfd and nep-mkt
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/c ... 018_macchiavello.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Firm and Market Response to Saving Constraints: Evidence from the Kenyan Dairy Industry (2017)
Working Paper: Firm and Market Response to Saving Constraints: Evidence from the Kenyan Dairy Industry (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cge:wacage:367

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