Who does and doesn’t pay taxes?

Arun Advani

CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)

Abstract: We use administrative tax data from audits of self-assessment tax returns to understand what types individuals are most likely to be non-compliant. Non-compliance is common, with one-third of taxpayers underpaying by some amount, although half of aggregate under-reporting is done by just 2% of taxpayers. Third party reporting reduces non-compliance, while working in a cash-prevalent industry increases it. However, compliance also varies significantly with individual characteristics: non-compliance is higher for men and younger people. These results matter for measuring inequality, for understanding taxpayer behaviour, and for targeting audit resources.

Keywords: JEL; Classification: (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cwa, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/c ... tions/wp530.2020.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Who does and doesn't pay taxes? (2022)
Working Paper: Who does and doesn’t pay taxes? (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cge:wacage:530

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jane Snape ().