Testing Willingness to Pay Elicitation Mechanisms in the Field: Evidence from Uganda

Konrad Burchardi (), Jonathan de Quidt, Selim Gulesci (), Benedetta Lerva and Stefano Tripodi
Additional contact information
Jonathan de Quidt: Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, CAGE, CEPR, CESifo, ThReD
Benedetta Lerva: Mistra Center for Sustainable Markets, Stockholm
Stefano Tripodi: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School

CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)

Abstract: Researchers frequently use variants of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit willingness to pay (WTP). These variants involve numerous incentive-irrelevant design choices, some of which carry advantages for implementation but may deteriorate participant comprehension or trust in the mechanism, which are well-known problems with the BDM. We highlight three such features and test them in the field in rural Uganda, a relevant population for many recent applications. Comprehension is very high, and 86 percent of participants bid optimally for an induced-value voucher, with little variation across treatments. This gives confidence for similar applications, and suggests the comprehension-expediency trade-off is mild.

Keywords: JEL Classification: C90; C93; D44; O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/c ... tions/wp541.2021.pdf

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Journal Article: Testing willingness to pay elicitation mechanisms in the field: Evidence from Uganda (2021)
Working Paper: Testing Willingness to Pay Elicitation Mechanisms in the Field: Evidence from Uganda (2021)
Working Paper: Testing Willingness to Pay Elicitation Mechanisms in the Field: Evidence from Uganda (2021)
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