Turnout in Concurrent Elections: Evidence from Two Quasi-Experiments in Italy
Enrico Cantoni,
Ludovica Gazze and
Jerome Schafer
Additional contact information
Ludovica Gazze: University of Warwick and CAGE
Jerome Schafer: University of Munich
CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)
Abstract:
We study the effects of different types of concurrent elections using individual-level administrative and survey data from Italy. Exploiting different voting ages for the two Houses of Parliament in a voter-level Regression Discontinuity Design, we find no effect of Senate voting eligibility on voter turnout or information acquisition. We also estimate city-level Differences in-Differences showing that concurrent high-salience municipal elections increase turnout in lower-salience provincial and European elections, but not vice-versa. These concurrency effects are concentrated in municipalities in the South of Italy, possibly due to weaker political parties and lower levels of social capital.
Keywords: turnout; concurrent elections; regression discontinuity design; Italy. JEL Classification: (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/c ... tions/wp557.2021.pdf
Related works:
Journal Article: Turnout in concurrent elections: Evidence from two quasi-experiments in Italy (2021) 
Working Paper: Turnout in Concurrent Elections: Evidence from Two Quasi-Experiments in Italy (2021) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cge:wacage:557
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jane Snape ().