Credibility and Inflation Targeting in an Emerging Market: The Case of Chile

Luis Cespedes and Claudio Soto

Working Papers Central Bank of Chile from Central Bank of Chile

Abstract: When the monetary authority lacks credibility it faces a larger trade-off between output and inflation. This poses important challenges for the implementation and design of an inflation targeting regime and an inflation stabilization process. In this paper we show how these challenges have determined different implementation phases of an inflation targeting regime in Chile, and how imperfect credibility is consistent with the different features of the disinflationary process followed by Chile during the 90s.

Date: 2005-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-lam, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chb:bcchwp:312

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