Conspicuous Conservatism In Risk Choice

Boaz Moselle, Francois Degeorge () and Richard Zeckhauser
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Boaz Moselle: The Brattle Group

No 07-15, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series from Swiss Finance Institute

Abstract: We analyze the risk levels chosen by agents who have private information regarding their quality, and whose performance will be judged and rewarded by outsiders. Assume that risk choice is observable. Even risk-neutral agents will choose risk strategically to enhance their expected reputation. We show that conspicuous conservatism is to be expected: agents of different qualities choose levels below those that would be chosen if quality were observable. This happens because bad agents must cloak their identity by choosing the same risk level as good agents, and good agents are more likely to distinguish themselves if they reduce the risk level. Our results contrast starkly with those for the case when risk choice cannot be observed.

Keywords: risk choice; signaling; conservatism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2007-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Conspicuous conservatism in risk choice (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp0715

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