The determinants of banks lobbying activities

Rajna GIBSON Brandon and Miret Padovani
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Rajna GIBSON Brandon: University of Geneva and Swiss Finance Institute
Miret Padovani: Vienna University

No 11-56, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series from Swiss Finance Institute

Abstract: In this paper, we examine the relationship between banks' lobbying activities, their size, nancial strength, and sources of income. First, we nd that banks are more likely to lobby when they are larger, have more vulnerable balance sheets, are less creditworthy, and have more diversi ed business pro les. We also nd that banks engaged in non-traditional businesses, e.g. securitization and trading, or in highly regulated businesses, e.g. insurance, hire more lobbyists and spend larger amounts on lobbying. Finally, we observe that the announcement of the Dodd-Frank bill led to increased lobbying by banks with higher trading revenues.

Keywords: banking; lobbying; nancial regulatory reform; Dodd-Frank bill. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2011-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-cfn
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1156

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