Technological Progress and Ownership Structure

Heng Geng, Harald Hau and Sandy Lai
Additional contact information
Heng Geng: University of Hong Kong
Sandy Lai: University of Hong Kong

No 15-39, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series from Swiss Finance Institute

Abstract: Innovation processes under patent protection generate holdup problems if complementary patents are owned by different firms. We show that in line with Hart and Moore (1990), shareholder ownership overlap across firms with patent complementarities helps mitigate such holdup problems and correlates significantly with higher patent investment and more patent success as measured by future citations. The positive innovation effect is strongest for concentrated overlapping ownership and for the cases when the overlapping shareholders are dedicated investors.

Keywords: Patents; holdup Problems; Innovation; Institutional Ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G31 G32 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-sbm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://ssrn.com/abstract=2662478 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Technological Progress and Ownership Structure (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1539

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