EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

On-Site Inspecting Zombie Lending

Diana Bonfim, Geraldo Cerqueiro, Hans Degryse and Steven Ongena
Additional contact information
Geraldo Cerqueiro: Catolica-Lisbon SBE

No 20-16, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series from Swiss Finance Institute

Abstract: Banks may have incentives to continue lending to “zombie” firms in order to avoid or delay the recognition of credit losses. In spite of growing regulatory pressure, there is evidence that “zombie lending” remains widespread, even in developed countries. We exploit information on a unique series of authoritative on-site inspections of bank credit portfolios in Portugal to investigate how such inspections affect banks’ future lending decisions. We find that following an inspection a bank becomes up to 9 percentage points less likely to refinance a firm with negative equity, implying a halving of the unconditional refinancing probability. Hence, banks structurally change their lending decisions following on-site inspections, suggesting that – even in the age of reg-tech – supervisory “reg-leg” can remain a potent tool to tackle zombie lending.

Keywords: zombie lending; bank supervision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cfn, nep-eec and nep-pay
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3530574 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On-Site Inspecting Zombie Lending (2023) Downloads
Working Paper: On-site inspecting zombie lending (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: On-site inspecting zombie lending (2020) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp2016

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series from Swiss Finance Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ridima Mittal ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp2016