Do Institutional Directors Matter?

Heng Geng, Harald Hau, Roni Michaely and Binh Nguyen
Additional contact information
Heng Geng: Victoria University of Wellington
Binh Nguyen: RMIT University Vietnam

No 22-89, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series from Swiss Finance Institute

Abstract: The large increase in common institutional ownership raises significant antitrust concerns, even if the precise channel of any potential influence on market outcomes is unclear. Using a novel dataset on shareholders’ board representation, we examine the role of common institutional directors (i.e., joint board representation by institutional shareholders) as one such potential channel with three main findings. First, institutional board representation is extremely low relative to extensive institutional ownership. Second, common institutional directors on rival firm boards are rare. Third, common institutional directors show no incremental effect on market outcomes amidst the positive relationship between common ownership and firm profitability.

Keywords: Common ownership; institutional board representation; competition policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54 pages
Date: 2022-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cfn, nep-com and nep-sea
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Related works:
Working Paper: Do Institutional Directors Matter? (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp2289

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