Do Analysts Tell the Truth? Do Shareholders Listen? An Experimental Study of Analysts' Forecasts and Shareholder Reaction

Timothy Shields ()
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Timothy Shields: The George L. Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: This work experimentally examines forecasting and trading behavior. Subjects play the role of both analyst and shareholder over the course of experiments consisting of a series of repeated games with or absent con icts of interest. In a stylized trading setting, I test whether standard equilibrium, normative behavior, or limited strategic reasoning best predicts behavior. In the presence of con icts of interest a substantial proportion of subjects' behavior appears non-skeptical in the role of shareholder, though the same subject is deceptive in the role of analyst. Absent con icts of interest, subjects behavior in the role of shareholder is nearer a best response to the same subject's behavior as analyst. The results are consistent with limited strategic reasoning and suggest that simply disclosing con icts of interest does not evoke skepticism of forecasting, nor does the elimination of con icts of interest in itself induce honesty.

Keywords: Experimental finance; under-reaction; overreaction; behavior; price inertia; risk aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2010-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-for
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:10-06

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