Perfect and Imperfect Real-Time Monitoring in a Minimum-Effort Game

Cary Deck () and Nikos Nikiforakis ()

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: This paper presents the results from a minimum-effort game in which individuals can observe the choices of others in real time. We find that under perfect monitoring almost all groups coordinate at the payoff-dominant equilibrium. However, when individuals can only observe the actions of their immediate neighbors in a circle network, monitoring improves neither coordination nor efficiency relative to a baseline treatment without real-time monitoring. We argue that the inefficiency of imperfect monitoring is due to information uncertainty, that is, uncertainty about the interpretation of the information available regarding the actions of others.

Keywords: minimum effort game; information uncertainty; real time monitoring; circle network; cheap talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-net and nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.chapman.edu/ESI/wp/Deck_Real-TimeMonitoringMinimum-EffortGame.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Perfect and imperfect real-time monitoring in a minimum-effort game (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:10-18

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