Moral Cleansing and Moral Licenses: experimental evidence

Pablo Brañas-Garza, Marisa Bucheli, Maria Paz Espinosa and Teresa M. García-Muñoz ()

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: Research on moral cleansing and moral self-licensing has introduced dynamic considerations in the theory of moral behavior. Past bad actions trigger negative feelings that make people more likely to engage in future moral behavior to offset them. Symmetrically, past good deeds favor a positive self-perception that creates licensing effects, leading people to engage in behavior that is less likely to be moral. In short, a deviation from a “normal state of being” is balanced with a subsequent action that compensates the prior behavior. We model the decision of an individual trying to reach the optimal level of moral self-worth over time and show that under certain conditions the optimal sequence of actions follows a regular pattern which combines good and bad actions. We conduct an economic experiment where subjects play a sequence of giving decisions (dictator games) to explore this phenomenon. We find that donation in the previous period affects present decisions and the sign is negative: participants’ behavior in every round is negatively correlated to what they did in the past. Hence donations over time seem to be the result of a regular pattern of self-regulation: moral licensing (being selfish after altruist) and cleansing (altruistic after selfish).

Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: MORAL CLEANSING AND MORAL LICENSES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:11-16

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