Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment among Students and Clerical Workers

Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection, and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior by adopting decentralized punishment, and also personal punishment when available.

Keywords: Non-standard subject pools; prisoner’s dilemma; peer punishment; artefactual field experiment; stranger matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cse, nep-edu, nep-evo, nep-hrm, nep-lab and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/e ... n-and-punishment.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategies of cooperation and punishment among students and clerical workers (2013)
Working Paper: Strategies of cooperation and punishment among students and clerical workers (2012)
Working Paper: Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment among Students and Clerical Workers (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-29

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