Equilibrium Play in Voluntary Ultimatum Games: Beneficence Cannot Be Extorted

Vernon Smith () and Bart Wilson

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: One robust result in experimental economics is the failure to observe equilibrium play in the ultimatum game. A heretofore unnoticed feature of the game is that neither player voluntarily chooses to play the game. Motivated by Adam Smith’s proposition that beneficence—like that of non- equilibrium play in the ultimatum game—cannot be extorted by force, we offer the responder the opportunity to opt out of the game for a mere $1 payoff for both players. We observe high rates of equilibrium play with highly unequal splits when responders choose to play such ultimatum games with both fixed and variable sums.

Keywords: ultimatum games; voluntary play; Adam Smith; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:17-17

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