Economics of Majoritarian Identity Politics

Rohit Ticku and Raghul S. Venkatesh ()
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Raghul S. Venkatesh: University of Aix-Marseille

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: Majoritarian identity politics has become salient in representative democracies. Why do par-ties engage in identity politics and what are its consequences? We present a model of elec-toral competition in which parties capture voter groups based on their identity, and compete over an economic policy platform for the support of non-partisan voters. In addition, the party that caters to majoritarian interests makes a costly investment in polarizing identity. The investment provides subsequent payoffs to voters who have a preference for identity. When voter preferences over policy platforms are idiosyncratic in nature, greater invest-ment in polarizing identity (i) increases both parties’ rents from office; and (ii) marginalizes minority voter interests. Further, the majoritarian party substitutes away from economic policy platforms. This enhances its overall payoffs in equilibrium and decreases that of the non-majoritarian party. We discuss the implications in context of episodes of majoritarian-ism in India, Turkey, Brazil, and the United States.

Keywords: Identity Politics; Clientalism; Inter-group Conflict; Public Goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D0 H0 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:20-13

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