Trust, reciprocity, and social history: New pathways of learning when max U (own reward) fails decisively

Vernon Smith ()

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: This evaluation begins with the BDM protocol—itself a methodological contribution—and the experimental findings. The question of the replicability and robustness of these unexpected results is addressed next in a summary of two subsequent experimental papers. We follow with a discussion of two attempts to explain qua understand the BDM findings; both, however, have methological deficiencies—Reciprocity and Social Preference explanations. Finally, we offer a brief on Adam Smith’s (1759; 1853; hereafter in the text, Sentiments) model of human sociability, based on strictly self-interested actors, that culminates in propositions that (1) account for trust game choices, and (2) predict action in new variations on trust game designs that, in the absence of Adam Smith’s model, would be neither natural or well-motivated.

Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:20-28

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