A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games With Multidimensional Private Information

Christian Ewerhart and Dan Kovenock

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which the resource allocation to a given battleÖeld is strictly monotone in the valuation of that battlefield. We also explore extensions such as heterogeneous budgets, the case M N, full-support type distributions, and network games.

Keywords: Colonel Blotto games; Private information; Bayes-Nash equilibrium; Generalized Dirichlet distributions; Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/338/

Related works:
Working Paper: A Class of N-player Colonel Blotto games with multidimensional private information (2021)
Working Paper: A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games with Multidimensional Private Information (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:21-01

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