How personalized networks can limit free riding: A multi-group version of the public goods game

Aaron Berman (), Laurence Iannaccone () and Mouli Modak ()
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Aaron Berman: Economic Science Institute, Chapman University
Laurence Iannaccone: Institute for the Study of Religion, Economics and Society, Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University
Mouli Modak: Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy, Chapman University

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: People belong to many diferent groups, and few belong to the same network of groups. Moreover, people routinely reduce their involvement in dysfunctional groups while increasing involvement in those they fnd more attractive. The net efect can be an increase in overall cooperation and the partial isolation of free-riders, even if free-riders are never punished, excluded, or recognized. We formalize and test this conjecture with an agent-based social simulation and a multi-good extension of the standard repeated public goods game. Our initial results from three treatments suggest that the multi-group setting indeed raises overall cooperation and dampens the impact of freeriders. We extend our understanding of this setting by imposing greater heterogeneity between groups through interweaving automated bot players amongst human subjects; whereby initial sessions of this amplify the aforementioned efects.

Keywords: cooperation; public goods game; lab experiment; multi-group (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C91 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-net
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:23-12

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