Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion

Anders Jensen

No 372, CID Working Papers from Center for International Development at Harvard University

Abstract: This paper studies individual and social motives in tax evasion. We build a simple dynamic model that incorporates these motives and their interaction. The social motives underpin the role of norms and is the source of the dynamics that we study. Our empirical analysis exploits the adoption in 1990 of a poll tax to fund local government in the UK, which led to widespread evasion. The evidence is consistent with the model’s main predictions on the dynamics of evasion.

Keywords: Tax; Evasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cid:wpfacu:372

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