Recursive no-envy

Diego Dominguez () and Antonio Nicolo'

No 803, Working Papers from Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM

Abstract: In economics the main efficiency criterion is that of Pareto-optimality. For problems of distributing a social endowment a central notion of fairness is no-envy (each agent should receive a bundle at least as good, according to her own preferences, as any of the other agent's bundle). For most economies there are multiple allocations satisfying these two properties. We provide a procedure, based on distributional implications of these two properties, which selects a single allocation which is Pareto-optimal and satisfies no-envy in two-agent exchange economies. There is no straightforward generalization of our procedure to more than two-agents.

Keywords: no-envy; fair allocation; recursive methods; exchange economies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2008-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cie:wpaper:0803

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