Bargaining Over Public Goods

Julio Dávila, Jan Eeckhout and Cesar Martinelli

No 901, Working Papers from Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM

Abstract: In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure whose equilibria converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent to the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2009-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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http://ftp.itam.mx/pub/academico/inves/martinelli/09-01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining over Public Goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over public goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over Public Goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over Public Goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over Public Goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over public goods (2008)
Working Paper: Bargaining over public goods (2008)
Working Paper: Bargaining over public goods (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cie:wpaper:0901

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