Are Information Disclosure Mandates Effective? Evidence from the Credit Card Market

Alan Elizondo () and Enrique Seira ()
Additional contact information
Alan Elizondo: Banco de México
Enrique Seira: Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)

No 1407, Working Papers from Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM

Abstract: Consumer protection in financial markets in the form of information disclosure is high on governments agendas, espite the fact that the empirical evidence on its effectiveness is scarce. To measure the impact of Truth-in-Lending-Act-type disclosures on default and indebtedness, as well as of debiasing warning messages and social comparison information, we implement a randomized control trial in the credit card market for a large population of indebted cardholders. We find that providing salient interest rate disclosures has no effect, while social comparisons and debiasing messages have only a odest effect. Other types of disclosures discussed in the paper could have larger effects

Keywords: Credit cards; information disclosure; truth in lending; Mexico. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D12 D14 D83 G02 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cta and nep-ict
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cie:wpaper:1407

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