Banks Defy Gravity in Tax Havens

Vincent Bouvatier, Gunther Capelle-Blancard and Anne-Laure Delatte

Working Papers from CEPII research center

Abstract: This paper provides the first quantitative assessment of the contribution of global banks in intermediating tax evasion. Applying gravity equations on a unique regulatory dataset based on comprehensive individual country-by-country reporting from all the Systemically Important Banks the European Union, we find that: 1) Tax havens generate a threefold extra presence of foreign banks; 2) The favorite destinations of tax evasion intermediated by European banks are Luxembourg and Monaco 3) British and German banks display the most aggressive strategies in tax havens; 4) New transparency requirements imposed in 2015 have not changed European banks commercial presence in tax havens; 5) Banks intermediate EUROS 550 billion of offshore deposits, that is 5% of their origin countries' GDP.

Keywords: Tax evasion; International banking; Tax havens; Country-by-country reporting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 G21 H22 H32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-ban, nep-eec, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Banks Defy Gravity in Tax Havens (2018)
Working Paper: Banks Defy Gravity in Tax Havens (2017)
Working Paper: Banks Defy Gravity in Tax Havens (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cii:cepidt:2017-16

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