Asymmetric Treatment of Identical Agents in Teams

Debashis Pal (), Arup Bose and David Sappington

University of Cincinnati, Economics Working Papers Series from University of Cincinnati, Department of Economics

Abstract: We investigate when identical agents will be treated asymmetrically in a simple team setting. Asymmetric treatment is optimal when the agents individual contributions to team performance are complements. Symmetric treatment of identical agents is optimal when the agents contributions are substitutes or when they are independent.

Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cta and nep-spo
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Journal Article: Asymmetric treatment of identical agents in teams (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cin:ucecwp:2008-08

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