Custom-made healthcare – An experimental investigation

Claudia Keser, Claude Montmarquette, Martin Schmidt and Cornelius Schnitzler

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate in a controlled laboratory experiment physician behavior in the case of payment heterogeneity. In the experiment, each physician provides medical care to patients whose treatments are paid for either under fee-for-service (FFS) or capitation (CAP). We observe that physicians customize care in response to the payment system. A FFS patient receives considerably more medical care than the corresponding CAP patient with the same illness and treatment preference. Physicians over-serve FFS patients and under-serve CAP patients. After a CAP payment reduction in the experiment we observe neither a quantity reduction under CAP nor a spillover into the treatment of FFS patients.

Keywords: Experimental Economics; Physician Reimbursement; Capitation; FFS; Customization; Fee Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I12 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hea and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2013s-15.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Custom-made health-care: an experimental investigation (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2013s-15

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