Revisiting Nash Wages Negotiations in Matching Models

Samir Amine, Sylvain Baumann, Pedro Lages Dos Santos and Fabrice Valognes

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: In labour economics theory, wage negotiations use to rely on a SymmetricNash Bargaining Solution. This article aims at showing that this kind of solution may be not relevant. Indeed, in a matching model framework, the comparison with the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution suggests that a reflection should systematically be made with respect to the negotiation power of each agent.

JEL-codes: C78 J64 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2015s-29

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