Bargaining and the Role of Negotiators’ Competitiveness

Claudia Keser, Stephan Müller, Emmanuel Peterle () and Holger A. Rau

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: This paper experimentally tests the relation between subjects’ competitiveness and bargaining behavior. Bargaining is investigated in a demand-ultimatum game, where the responder can request a share of the pie from the proposer. The re-sults show that highly competitive proposers earn less, since they make lower offers, which are more often rejected. Similarly, highly competitive responders achieve lower payoffs, since they request excessive amounts which induces lower proposals. These findings establish a link between competitiveness and bargaining as suggested by social and evolutionary psychology. Thus, we identify one driver of the empirical heterogeneity of bargaining behavior and outcomes. From a management perspec-tive our findings highlight that giving thought to employees’ competitiveness before delegating them to participate in negotiations may pay off.

Keywords: Bargaining; Competitiveness; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-04-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2018s-08.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2018s-08

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Webmaster ().