Artificial Intelligence and Market Manipulations: Ex-ante Evaluation in the Regulator's Arsenal

Nathalie de Marcellis-Warin, Frédéric Marty, Eva Thelisson and Thierry Warin

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: The digital economy's development poses questions unprecedented in their magnitude in potential market manipulations and manipulations of consumer choices. Deceptive and unfair strategies in consumer law may coexist and mutually reinforce each other with infringements in the field of competition, whether it be algorithmic collusion or abuse of a dominant position. Faced with the difficulty of detecting and sanctioning these practices ex-post, questions are raised about the sanction's dissuasive effect and its capacity to prevent possibly irreversible damage. To this end, this article considers the available supervision tools for the authorities in charge of market surveillance, the consumers or the stakeholders of the companies concerned.

Keywords: Algorithmic Manipulation; Deceptive Practices; Unfair Practices; Algorithmic Surveillance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D18 K21 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-12-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Artificial Intelligence and Market Manipulations: Ex-ante Evaluation in the Regulator's Arsenal (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2020s-64

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