A dynamic analysis of international environmental agreements under partial cooperation

Luca Colombo, Paola Labrecciosa and Ngo Long
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Luca Colombo and Luca Colombo

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: We study the dynamics of equilibrium membership of an international environmental agreement aimed at increasing the stock of a global public good such as climate change mitigation. In contrast with previous studies, we assume partial cooperation among signatories, and show that the coalition size can be large and increasing over time even when the initial coalition size is small. We highlight a novel trade-off between agreements that are narrow but deep and long-lived versus those that are broad and shallow but short-lived. We show that loose cooperative agreements, which are broad but shallow and short-lived, are both welfare superior and Pareto superior to tight cooperative agreements, which are narrow but deep and long-lived. We also show that conditions exist under which the equilibrium coalition size is efficient. Nous étudions la dynamique d'adhésion à l'équilibre à un accord environnemental international visant à accroître le stock d'un bien public mondial tel que l'atténuation du changement climatique. Contrairement aux études précédentes, nous supposons une coopération partielle entre les signataires et montrons que la taille de la coalition peut être importante et augmenter au fil du temps même lorsque la taille initiale de la coalition est petite. Nous mettons en évidence un nouveau compromis entre les accords qui sont étroits mais profonds et de longue durée et ceux qui sont larges et superficiels mais de courte durée. Nous montrons que les accords de coopération partielle, qui sont larges mais superficiels et de courte durée, sont à la fois supérieurs en termes de bien-être aux accords de coopération serrés, qui sont étroits mais profonds et de longue durée. Nous montrons également qu'il existe des conditions dans lesquelles la taille de la coalition d'équilibre est efficace.

Keywords: differential games; climate change mitigation; stable coalitions; coefficient of cooperation; social welfare; jeux différentiels; atténuation du changement climatique; coalitions stables; coefficient de coopération; bien-être social (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D60 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-01-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-env and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: A dynamic analysis of international environmental agreements under partial cooperation (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2022s-01

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