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Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris

Levine's Working Paper Archive from David K. Levine

Date: 2014-02-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-mkt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Working Paper: Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction (2013) Downloads
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