Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction
Dirk Bergemann,
Benjamin Brooks and
Stephen Morris
Levine's Working Paper Archive from David K. Levine
Date: 2014-02-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-mkt
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Working Paper: Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction (2013)
Working Paper: Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000898
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