Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

Vincent Crawford and Nagore Iriberri

Levine's Bibliography from UCLA Department of Economics

Date: 2007-04-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (310)

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http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/17July06LevelKAuctions.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? (2007)
Working Paper: Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? (2006)
Working Paper: Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? (2005)
Working Paper: Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? (2005)
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