Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment

Vasiliki Skreta

No 346, UCLA Economics Online Papers from UCLA Department of Economics

Date: 2005-01-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal auction design under non-commitment (2015)
Working Paper: Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment (2013)
Working Paper: Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment (2010)
Working Paper: Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment (2008)
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