United We Vote

Jon X. Eguia

No 1208, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Abstract: This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents in a larger electorate can obtain by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all in one direction. We show under which conditions an agent will benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, whether being part of it or stepping out is most advantageous for an individual agent and what are the different optimal internal voting rules to aggregate preferences within the coalition.

Keywords: voting bloc; coalition formation; voting rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2004-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clt:sswopa:1208

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