Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting

Patrick Hummel

No 1236, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Keywords: perfect information games; extensive games; backward induction; weakly dominated strategies; iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies; binary voting agendas; sequential voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2005-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wp1236.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wp1236.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wp1236.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clt:sswopa:1236

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Victoria Mason ().