The Non-Democratic Roots of Elite Capture: Evidence from Soeharto Mayors in Indonesia

Monica Martinez-Bravo, Priya Mukherjee and Andreas Stegmann ()
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Andreas Stegmann: CEMFI, Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros, https://www.cemfi.es

Working Papers from CEMFI

Abstract: Democracies widely differ in the extent to which powerful elites and interest groups retain influence over politics. While a large literature argues that elite capture is rooted in a country's history, our understanding of the determinants of elite persistence is limited. In this paper, we show that the way in which democratic transitions unfold is a key determinant of the extent of elite capture. We exploit quasi-random variation that originated during the Indonesian transition: Soeharto-regime mayors were allowed to finish their terms before being replaced by new leaders. Since mayors' political cycles were not synchronized, this event generated exogenous variation in how long old-regime mayors remained in their position during the democratic transition. Districts with longer exposure to old-regime mayors experience worse governance outcomes, higher elite persistence, and lower political competition in the medium-run. The results suggest that slower transitions towards democracy allow the old-regime elites to capture democracy.

Keywords: Institutions; elections; elite capture. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H75 O12 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01, Revised 2017-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-sea
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

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Journal Article: The Non‐Democratic Roots of Elite Capture: Evidence From Soeharto Mayors in Indonesia (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2016_1601

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