Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. its Alternatives

Caterina Calsamiglia, Chao Fu () and Maia Güell ()
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Chao Fu: University of Wisconsin-Madison
Maia Güell: University of Edinburgh

Working Papers from CEMFI

Abstract: We develop a model of school choices by households under the popular Boston mechanism (BM) and a new method to fully solve household problem that is infeasible to solve via traditional method. We estimate the joint distribution of household preferences and sophistication types using administrative data from Barcelona. Our counterfactual policy analyses show that a change from BM to the student deferred acceptance mechanism would create more losers than winners and decrease the average welfare by 1,020 euros, while a change from BM to the top trading cycles mechanism has the opposite effect and increases the average welfare by 460 euros.

Keywords: School choice; Boston; deferred acceptance and top trading cycles. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D63 I24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives (2018)
Working Paper: Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives (2018)
Working Paper: Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives (2015)
Working Paper: Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives (2014)
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