College Admissions with Entrance Exams: Centralized versus Decentralized

Isa Hafalir, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Dorothea Kübler and Morimitsu Kurino

No 2015-E7, GSIA Working Papers from Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business

Abstract: We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. Many predictions of the theory are supported by the experiments, yet we find a number of differences that render DCA less attractive than CCA compared to the equilibrium benchmark.

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Related works:
Journal Article: College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized (2018)
Journal Article: College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized (2018)
Working Paper: College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized (2016)
Working Paper: College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized (2014)
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