The Electricity Market Game

Stephen Spear ()

No 2003-E17, GSIA Working Papers from Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of imperfect competition in unregulated electricity markets from a general equilibrium perspective, and demonstrates that horizontal market power can explain both the large peak-period price spikes observed recently in California and elsewhere, and the marked reduction in additions to capacity that have also occurred during the transition to competitive markets.

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