(De)regulation of the European Ramp Handling Market – Lessons to Be Learned from an Institutional Perspective?

Johannes Fuhr ()

No 2006-08, Working Papers from Center for Network Industries and Infrastructure (CNI)

Abstract: Ten years have passed since the European Commission obliged its member states to open their national handling markets to competition. This paper analyzes whether the policy has allowed airlines to design efficient contractual and organizational solutions with their ramp handling suppliers. Applying transaction cost economics as the lens of analysis, we propose that the award of temporary limited operating licenses to new entrants results in inferior economic performance. The presented econometric results on the duration of 42 ramp handling contracts and a qualitative case study on the award practices at German airports are largely supportive of this proposition.

Keywords: Transaction cost; contract; deregulation; air transport; ramp handling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 L42 L93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cni:wpaper:2006-08

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