State Aid to Infrastructure: Do Competitively Selected Operators Obtain an Undue Advantage?

Phedon Nicolaides and Nadir Preziosi
Additional contact information
Nadir Preziosi: Scuola di Dottorato in Scienze Umane e Sociali

No 33, Bruges European Economic Research Papers from European Economic Studies Department, College of Europe

Abstract: This paper reviews several cases where the Commission presumed that competitively selected operators of large infrastructure projects derived an undue advantage from state aid. The aid was granted to the owners of the infrastructure to supported investment in construction or upgrading. The practice of the Commission is not consistent or clear. The paper also shows that under reasonable assumptions,competitive selection of operators is indeed capable of eliminating any advantage above market rates of return or market rates of cost of capital. The paper demonstrates, both theoretically and with the use of numerical examples, that concession fees take into account any aid that is granted to the owners of infrastructure for its construction or upgrading.

Keywords: State Aid; Competitive Selection; Auction Theory; Concession Fees; Funding Gap (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D73 H71 H72 L38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2015-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ppm and nep-tre
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.coleurope.eu/system/files_force/research-paper/beer33.pdf?download=1 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:coe:wpbeer:33

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Bruges European Economic Research Papers from European Economic Studies Department, College of Europe Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jessie Moerman (jessie.moerman@coleurope.eu this e-mail address is bad, please contact repec@repec.org).