Bogotá: the collapse of a political machine

Rafael Santos

No 4011, Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE

Abstract: In Bogotá the 1991 reforms obstructed a market for votes. Clientelism lost itseffectiveness; citizens developed a vote of opinion and the city showed an outstanding performance in the provision of public goods and social services. This story is illustrated with a novel panel data at the neighborhood voting precinct level from 1988 to 2003. An interesting episode exposes the changing class preferentes of Bogotá citizens for each of its mayors. However, the main result is the structural break caused by the reforms. Prior to 1991, the areas with the most exposure to clientelism generated a greater percentage of votes for traditional parties and obtained a greater coverage of social services; since 1991, both relationships are no longer true. A political machine collapses.

Keywords: political institutions; institutional change; elections; clientelism; votebuying; public policies; Bogotá (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 E62 H11 H72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44
Date: 2007-08-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-his
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:004011

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