Cooperation under Fear, Greed and Prison: the Role of Redistributive Inequality in the Evolution of Cooperation

César Mantilla

No 9386, Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE

Abstract: This work offers an analysis of cooperation dilemmas making emphasis in the role of the unequal outcomes. Increases in the benefit from leaving mutual cooperation are associated to the greed dimension, while increases in the cost from leaving mutual defection are associated to fear dimension. The manipulation of these dimensions allows defining two cooperation dilemmas derived from the standard Prisoner´s Dilemma. Using two different frameworks, classical game theory and evolutionary game theory, is shown that the magnitude and the direction of these inequalities have an effect over the decision of cooperation.

Keywords: Prisoner's; Dilemma; -; Payoff; Inequality; -; Evolutionary; Game; Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C91 D03 D30 D71 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40
Date: 2012-02-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:009386

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